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THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL
LLOYD K. GARRISON LECTURE
Climate and Energy Policy in the Obama
Administration
JODY FREEMAN*
I am very pleased to be here and honored because I recognize
the importance of this lecture. I know several of the people that
have come before me and I am flattered to be included in their
company. I am also a big admirer of the Pace program. You have
been doing this much longer than many of the other law schools
and you are well positioned to continue to be a leader in this domain for the future. I want to especially thank the Dean and also
Lin Harmon for all the trouble she has gone through to arrange
this and, of course, Ann Powers for being such lovely hosts.
Thank you very much for having me.
What I thought I would do is give you a sense of the “state of
the play” in energy and climate policy—where we are, how we got
here, and then a little bit of discussion about what the future
looks like. Let me begin by talking about the current moment.
As you know, I served as Counselor for Energy and Climate
Change in the White House for the first part of the Administration when we were moving the climate bill in 2009 and 2010. And
as you are also well aware, the Waxman-Markey Bill, otherwise
known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES),
got through the House but did not clear the Senate.

Jody Freeman, J.D., was Counselor for Energy and Climate Change in the
White House. She was counselor and senior advisor to Carol Browner, the Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change. Professor Freeman
teaches at Harvard Law School. She is the founding Director of the Harvard
Law School Environmental Law Program. Professor Freeman is a prominent
scholar of administrative law and regulation. She is a leading thinker on collaborative and contractual approaches to governance as well as one of the nation’s
leading scholars of environmental law.
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The first point is that the effort to pass comprehensive legislation to cap carbon emissions and make a number of other energy reforms—the effort to accomplish this in a single package—
failed. Secondly, in the wake of this failure, the President has
called for making progress on climate and energy policy in what
he has called “chunks,” including, most prominently, by passing a
federal “clean energy standard.” Yet so far the “chunks” strategy
seems also to have come up short. We have not seen a federal
clean energy standard, although, as I will mention later, many
states have adopted their own renewable energy portfolio standards. Nor has Congress chosen to pass smaller bite-sized pieces
of the more comprehensive bill by, for example, adopting a utility
sector strategy to control greenhouse gases (GHGs).
Third, and somewhat ironically, the common law as an avenue for redress for harms caused by climate change has become
extremely limited, if not entirely foreclosed on, by the Supreme
Court decision last year in American Electric Power v. Connecticut which held that the Clean Air Act precludes federal common
law public nuisance claims. Notably, this was an 8-0 decision in
which Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court (Justice
Sonia Sotomayor recused herself, since she had sat on the Second
Circuit panel from which the case was appealed). This decision
followed predictably from the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA. As the Court explained, by passing legislation comprehensively addressing air pollution regulation, including GHG pollution, Congress had precluded federal common law claims. So, in a
way, this is the price of success—a victory on one front forecloses
another.
Fourth and finally, the international state of play is undergoing something of a metamorphosis, evolving from the Kyoto style
regime of legally binding targets and timetables into a different
kind of regime consisting of “pledge and review,” meaning that
countries will voluntarily make commitments to address GHGs
that will be monitored and verified in some manner.
That is essentially where we are. I think of this in terms of
three pendulum swings [gesturing to a power point slide]. The
first such swing is from the legislative to the executive branch. I
think it is fair to say with the failure of a comprehensive climate
and energy bill that the power has shifted at least temporarily,
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and unless Congress acts, to the Executive Branch of the federal
government. And since 2009, the Executive Branch has done
quite a bit with the authority that it possesses. I will try to explain how the Administration has taken the reigns of the existing
statutes and really tried to make progress on climate and energy
goals despite congressional inaction. The second pendulum shift
is from federal to state. In environmental law, momentum often
goes back and forth from state to federal leadership as you know.
There was a significant state effort to begin addressing climate change in the middle to late 2000s. This was a really generative period for state climate and energy programs. At the
time, many people thought that the state programs, which included early reporting programs, state trading schemes, performance standards, and renewable energy requirements, would ultimately largely be replaced by a comprehensive federal regime.
Some of the state and regional efforts anticipated a federal capand-trade program, and were expressly designed to fold into it.
The states went dormant for a couple of years—not entirely, but
somewhat—anticipating that the federal government would take
action. Now that Congress has not passed legislation, we are seeing the momentum shift back to the states, at least temporarily.
The final pendulum swing is away from a comprehensive approach, like the one in ACES, which included not just an economy-wide cap-and-trade regime to reduce GHGS, but also incentives for carbon capture and sequestration, a renewable energy
standard, and a whole host of incentives and programs in the
transportation, electricity, and industrial sectors. It also envisioned an important role for agriculture and forestry in providing
carbon reduction credits, or “offsets,” to be purchased by sources
covered by the cap. That all-encompassing economy-wide approach has yielded to a more piecemeal step-by-step approach.
I thought that I would summarize this in a user-friendly way,
like magazines do, by telling you what’s “out” and what’s “in”
[gesturing to a slide]. I am sure this is not entirely comprehensive but it gives you a reasonably good overview. Cap-and-trade
is clearly out. Taxes you may be surprised to hear—at least I
could make an argument about this—could be in. Other things
might wind up being in too, like a clean energy standard. Congress is out. People are not expecting much from Congress, cer-
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tainly in an election year, and it is difficult to see the pathway for
Congress to pass anything as comprehensive as ACES, even after
the election. Inaction by Congress means that the Executive
branch, the President, is in. I will tell you the story of what the
President has done so far with the tools he has, including the
Clean Air Act. In the international context, “targets and timetables” are out. As you know, the Kyoto Protocol obligated only the
developed economies to cut emissions an average of about 5% in a
regime that was legally binding. This has been only marginally
successful, in part because it did not bind the developing world to
commitments, even though they are a growing share of world
emissions, or provide for technology transfer and other key pieces
of the puzzle. The Kyoto approach has yielded to a new framework of “commitments” or pledges, which are to be monitored and
reviewed.
Coal is out. As I will describe in more detail later, coal is losing ground relative to other energy sources like natural gas for a
number of reasons, including both economic and regulatory drivers. As coal-fired power plants are considering whether to refurbish, retrofit, or retire, the balance is tilting toward retirement.
The economics of natural gas is a big part of that story and it is a
big story indeed. And finally, as you see here, “climate change” is
out. Energy, especially “clean energy,” is in. The political rhetoric has shifted decisively in that direction. No one, it seems,
wants to talk about climate change.
I want to turn now to the Executive Branch tools being deployed in the absence of congressional action. The primary
mechanism, as you all know, is the Clean Air Act. In the wake of
Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that GHGs are a pollutant subject to regulation under the Act, EPA has begun to take steps to
set standards. In fact, we began doing this in the Administration
even as the climate bill was moving through Congress, partly as a
prod to Congress and partly as an insurance policy. The first step
following Massachusetts v. EPA was to make the finding about
whether GHGs endanger public health and welfare and, if the
answer was yes, to set GHG standards in the transportation sector (which is responsible for about 30% of U.S. emissions) and
then ultimately to address emissions from stationary sources, including coal-fired power plants, refineries, manufacturing, etc.
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This set of regulations would come to be known as the “greenhouse gas package.”
The Agency has also pursued non-GHG regulation, however,
which is just as important. This is something that people sometimes overlook, but when EPA pays attention to its core traditional mission to regulate conventional pollutants (the National
Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) pollutants, like NOx,
SOx, and PM)—when EPA is regulating to protect the public
health—it is simultaneously necessarily advancing GHG reduction goals because, of course, tighter regulation for conventional
pollutants reduces all pollution including CO2 and other GHGs.
Through a variety of rules that are proposed, or about to be proposed, we see a more comprehensive strategy emerging, one that
is designed to reduce GHGs across the board. These include the
Cross State Air Pollution Rule, which EPA redesigned after the
D.C. Circuit struck down its first incarnation during the Bush
Administration. This rule deals with interstate transfers of NOx,
SOx, and ozone. EPA has also promulgated a toxics rule to control mercury, replacing another rule that had been struck down
by the D.C. Circuit in the prior Administration. In regulating
toxics and cross-state pollution, EPA is necessarily also making
plants more efficient and thus reducing GHGs.
The most important policy initiative of the Obama Administration thus far, however, is historic fuel efficiency standards
set jointly by EPA and the Department of Transportation, or
more specifically the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Full disclosure is required here: I led the
White House effort, so I am probably going to be somewhat biased
when I talk about its beneficial effects. But I think it is fair to
say, and many others have said, that this policy is the Administration’s most important accomplishment in the energy, climate,
and environmental domain. Certainly it is the most aggressive,
most ambitious effort to improve fuel efficiency in the history of
the United States. The so-called “national auto policy” (also
known as “the car deal”) combines the first ever federal GHG
standards set by EPA with NHTSA’s traditional authority to set
fuel economy standards. The challenge in creating this policy
was to figure out a way for EPA, which is authorized to set emissions standards under the Clean Air Act, and NHTSA, which is
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authorized to set Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards under the Energy Conservation laws, to row in the
same direction and set a single set of harmonized standards.
Complicating this task was the political imperative of ensuring that the federal standards would garner the support of California, which had gone ahead during the Bush Administration
and promulgated their own GHG standards for passenger cars
and trucks. California had at the time sought a preemption
waiver from EPA, which is required under the Clean Air Act if it
wished to set more stringent standards than the federal government. The Bush Administration denied the waiver. Yet, during
the 2008 presidential campaign, candidate Obama had said that
his EPA would reconsider that waiver request. In addition, fourteen other states were poised to adopt California’s standards if
the waiver were granted. Thus, if implemented, the California
standards would govern 40% of the car market.
This would have created a costly and complicated patchwork
of regulation. In the states that had not adopted California
standards, auto manufacturers would have been subject to a federal CAFE standard set by NHTSA (the traditional fuel economy
standard expressed in miles per gallon) and new GHG pollution
standards set separately by EPA (in grams per mile). At the
same time, in the states that had adopted California’s standards,
there would be even stricter GHG standards. Further complicating matters, the auto industry had launched over a dozen
preemption lawsuits challenging California’s legal authority to
set these GHG standards. The industry argued that California
was preempted by the federal CAFE statute, which gives exclusive authority to set fuel economy standards to NHTSA. The Energy Policy Conservation Act says that anything “related” to fuel
efficiency is preempted, so industry argued that California’s GHG
standards amounted to an indirect effort to usurp the exclusive
federal power to set fuel economy standards since the only way to
reduce GHGs is by improving vehicle fuel efficiency.
So when the President took office, California was expecting to
get its waiver of federal preemption with fourteen states poised to
adopt its program; industry preemption litigation trying to block
this effort was pending in federal appeals courts; EPA, for the
first time, was about to exercise its authority to set federal GHG
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standards; and NHTSA was under a deadline to promulgate its
next five-year round of CAFE standards. In the face of all this,
we sought to produce a single national standard that would satisfy the President’s environmental commitments, satisfy the two
federal agencies and their legal requirements, satisfy California,
and ensure the support of the auto industry. And we also had to
consider the autoworkers union (the UAW), the states, and the
environmental groups. I can tell you that working through all of
these legal, regulatory, and political complications was like playing six-dimensional chess blindfolded.
And yet, amazingly, we succeeded. The first round of these
standards, which apply to model years 2012-2016, will achieve
35.5 mpg by 2016 putting us on a path of fuel efficiency that we
have never experienced—an average of about 5% improvement
per year. Based on the template that we established in that first
round, the Administration signed everyone up for a second round
from 2017-2025, which will ultimately achieve 54.5 mpg, or about
double our current fuel efficiency. This is a real achievement.
The standards are projected to save four billion barrels of oil between 2017 and 2025, cut carbon emissions two billion metric
tons, and save folks at the pump over the lifetime of their vehicles
up to $4,400. So this is a win-win-win for the environment, the
industry, and for governance.
Notably, all of this happened via voluntary agreement, not as
part of a legally binding settlement and without the imprimatur
of a court. The auto industry filed “letters of commitment” with
the regulatory agencies (the EPA and the Department of Transportation) in which they promised not to challenge the new
standards if they ultimately looked substantially like what was
initially proposed by the agencies in a “notice of intent.”
This advance pledge not to litigate was remarkable given the
history of litigation over CAFE standards. The industry did this
because the trade for them was worth it—federal uniformity and
one-stop compliance in exchange for their assent. And they felt
comfortable after extensive discussions with the agencies, which
reassured them that they would be able to comply. The new
standards provide considerable compliance flexibility by allowing
the companies to earn and trade credits both within and between
fleets. They also ramp up stringency over time, at a reasonable
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pace, allowing the industry time to adjust. And perhaps most
importantly, they gave the industry certainty, clarity, and predictability by replacing a patchwork of regulation, which was a
far less appealing scenario. I am now more certain than ever, after this experience, that industry is actually less concerned about
stringency most of the time and much more concerned about clarity and predictability so they can plan their investments going
forward. What the Administration was able to give them was
clarity about the regulatory trajectory first to 2016 and then out
to 2025, so they could focus on building the cars of what we all
hope will be a cleaner energy future.
At the same time California promised in its letter of commitment not to implement its own program, even if EPA granted
the waiver. As the President had promised, EPA did reconsider
the waiver, decided that the legal foundation for denying it was
wrong, and reversed that denial. California said, “[t]hank you
very much, we appreciate the legal entitlement to regulate but we
agree to stand down and accept compliance with the new federal
program as compliance with our program.” Finally, as part of
this package the auto industry also agreed, although somewhat
reluctantly, to drop all of its preemption litigation—over a dozen
suits were stayed and then ultimately dropped.
It is especially interesting that these letters of commitment
are not, strictly speaking, legal documents. They are instead very
detailed tit-for-tat agreements that say: if you do what you promised to do, we will do as we promised, one step at a time, one after
the other. This is essentially a “trust but verify” regime. This is
a rather creative mechanism for memorializing the agreement.
The uniqueness of this was driven home recently when I went to
the D.C. Circuit to see the oral argument in the GHG litigation,
in which these standards, along with EPA’s endangerment finding and other GHG related rules, are being challenged by a coalition of industry groups.1 There, in the ceremonial courtroom, was
a sea of lawyers sitting at the counsel table on the industry side.
On the other side was, of course, the government, along with the
1. Subsequent to this lecture, the four challenged rules, known collectively
as the “greenhouse gas package,” were upheld by the D.C. Circuit. See Coal for
Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 09-1322, 2012 WL 2381955 (D.C. Cir. June
26, 2012).
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state and environmental intervenors, plus one lone guy who represented the auto industry. If you have any sense of the thirtyplus years of conflict over fuel efficiency between the auto industry and the environmentalists and states, to see counsel for the
auto industry standing on the side of the government and saying
EPA got this right was a remarkable experience.
Of course, a necessary result of setting the first binding
standard for GHGs under the Clean Air Act is that it automatically triggers permit requirements in other programs under the
Act. So issuing this GHG standard for mobile sources tilted the
first domino in what was a self-executing series of dominos that
led inexorably to regulation of stationary sources as well. Under
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program, new
or modified stationary sources must obtain permits and apply
best available control technology to all “regulated” pollutants,
now including GHGs. This creates an enormous management
challenge for EPA and the state permitting agencies, since the
statute requires sources that emit as few as 250 or 100 tons per
year of a regulated pollutant to meet these standards. The low
thresholds applied to GHGs would result in many thousands and
perhaps millions of new permit applicants compared to the few
hundred of sources that must get permits now. Faced with this,
EPA has sought to raise the thresholds temporarily administratively, phasing in the program and requiring permits initially for
only the very largest emitters. The rule EPA adopted to implement this approach, known as the “tailoring rule,” is, as a result,
at least temporarily a deregulatory measure. But the question is
whether EPA has the legal authority to adjust these statutory
thresholds on their rationale, which is that there is an “administrative necessity.” This rule too is part of the litigation I mentioned, in which a coalition of industry is challenging the EPA’s
package or GHG related rules.
In addition to these Clean Air Act mechanisms for addressing
GHGs, the Administration has used other federal levers to make
progress on climate change and advance its clean energy goals.
For example, the Department of Energy has intensified its effort
to set appliance standards, which will result in billions of dollars
in cost savings and reduced environmental impacts once they are
all implemented. This process, which is governed by a longstand-
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ing consent decree, was proceeding very slowly in the Bush Administration, but the Obama Administration picked up the pace
because of the significant potential for both environmental benefits and cost savings.
At the same time, the Department of the Interior has accelerated siting renewable energy projects on federal lands, both onshore and offshore. The onshore process was improved through
another collaborative exercise that brought nine federal agencies
together to streamline a complicated approval process. These
agencies either have jurisdiction over the relevant federal lands,
or possess regulatory authority over siting. As a result of the
many players, the permit process can be lengthy, costly, and redundant. So we hammered out a memorandum of understanding
among the agencies to accelerate and simplify permitting for renewables without sacrificing environmental standards, simply by
designating a lead agency and requiring consolidated, integrated
reviews. This is a quiet kind of accomplishment that few people
notice, but it could make a big difference. And it was motivated
by the idea that if Congress will not pass legislation, we will at
least get our federal house in order using the authorities and jurisdictional powers we have and, in this case, accelerate clean energy development on federal lands.
In addition, the Department of Energy has made significant
investments in renewable energy technology, from advanced batteries, to “smart grid” systems, to promising biofuels that are at
such an early stage of development that they cannot always attract private capital. A significant portion of this funding came
from the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, which made
the biggest investment in the energy sector in U.S. history. Depending on how you count, sixty to ninety billion dollars of the
Recovery Act went into supporting clean energy and energy efficiency.
Then there is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), which, although not an executive branch agency, has
taken steps in line with Administration priorities to modify
transmission policy and make it friendlier to renewable energy.
For example, FERC has proposed a rule to help integrate renewable energy into the grid and promote transmission planning that
would consider not just reliability issues and economic concerns,
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but other public policy matters like climate change and environmental impacts.
This list of agency initiatives is not complete, but it gives you
a sense of the kinds of things you can do under existing statutes
with the executive power the government already possesses and
by enlisting independent agencies. To see the entire picture
though, it is important to also consider state and regional efforts.
I want to save sufficient time for questions so I will not go
through them in great detail but I just want to list a number of
initiatives that are currently underway: the regional GHG initiative (RGGI), which is the first regional cap-and-trade system in
the United States; California’s Global Warming Solutions Act under which the state Air Resources board has established both a
state-wide cap-and-trade system and a low carbon fuel standard;
and renewable portfolios standards which have been adopted by
over thirty states. There are a variety of other state level
measures too, at some stage of development.
Not all of these efforts have been successful, however. For
example the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord, which was so
promising in the middle part of the 2000s, has now been informally suspended. New Jersey pulled out of RGGI. So the states are
in a state of flux at the moment. The real question is, assuming
the existing state and federal programs are reasonably successful,
how much progress could you make in an admittedly piecemeal
approach to GHG reductions? This assumes using the executive
power pro-actively, combined with state and regional efforts that
might be reenergized in the absence of leadership by the Congress. How much does it add up to? When I was in the Administration we discussed this and tried to make these projections.
Conveniently, the World Resource Institute did the very same exercise and published their results. They describe three scenarios.
The first scenario is the least ambitious and predicts limited success with the measures I described, resulting in 5% reduction in
GHGs by 2030. The middle scenario, which is somewhat more
ambitious and assumes greater implementation and compliance,
predicts 18% reduction of GHGs by 2030. The most ambitious
scenario, which assumes full implementation and compliance,
predicts 27% GHG reduction by 2030.
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The problem is that if you are on a path to 85% GHG reduction by 2050—which is projected to be necessary to avoid a greater than two degree Celsius temperature rise—in order to get on
that pathway, by 2030 you need to be somewhere between 51%
and 64% below 2005 levels. And the most ambitious, most aggressive, most hopeful scenario in the WRI analysis, (which
frankly just has to be unrealistic given what we know about implementation and enforcement) produces only a 27% reduction.
So the happy story I began to tell you about the federal government using the power it possesses, and the states re-engaging
as the pendulum swings their way, is not necessarily as happy a
story as we need to have. For the most positive projections to be
a reality requires a lot to go right: the states have to deliver on
their promises; the states have to not run out of money before
they deliver on their promises; the regional efforts that are not
yet up and running need to get up and running; once up and running they need to be operational and successful; the federal government must maintain the path it is on and these initiatives
must be stable across administrations as they change, which is a
big expectation; there can be no major legal problems (which is
fanciful since every major rule the EPA promulgates in this domain tends to be challenged); and we have to expect that we will
continue to come out of the recession in a way that will not undermine any of these programs. This is a lot to expect given the
history of litigation and the slow implementation of environmental standards and rules.
The second-to-last thing I wanted to talk about are the legal
challenges we face. I have described to you the litigation in the
D.C. Circuit challenging EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air
Act. There are already legal challenges to the state initiatives,
and more will come, under the dormant commerce clause. And
we are also seeing trade related challenges to state clean energy
programs as violating World Trade Organization (WTO) law. If
the states promote renewable energy in a way that either reaches
extraterritorially into other states by seeking to regulate their
energy production, or in a way that tries to hoard renewable energy for their own state, or in a way that discriminates in interstate commerce, they will be struck down as violating the
dormant commerce clause. In addition, the so-called “green trade
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war” between China and the United States has led to allegations
that state efforts to promote clean energy are illegal subsidies
under WTO law. States have to worry then not just about domestic constitutional challenges, but also to charges that they are unlawfully subsidizing clean energy in violation of U.S. trade
agreements. These are very substantial legal challenges. At a
minimum they can cause a lot of delay, and delay as you know, is
the enemy of GHG regulation and the prospects for mitigating the
worst impacts of climate change.
Finally, I think the most important question right now is:
what does an integrated energy and climate policy look like? It is
very hard to put together an energy policy that promotes what
everyone calls energy independence, is good for national security,
and also goes in the right direction to address climate change.
One can fairly easily come up with an energy policy that is good
for national security and energy independence and that ignores
climate change, but it becomes much more challenging to produce
an integrated plan. And this puts environmentalists in a very
uncomfortable situation where they have to make difficult
tradeoffs. For example, the environmental community has traditionally opposed nuclear power, but nuclear power of course takes
on a very different valence when we consider it in light of our
goals to produce low carbon energy. After all, nuclear energy
happens to be a zero carbon source even if, because it relies on
uranium, it is not renewable.
So one has to begin working out how one feels about issues
that environmentalists long thought were settled. We knew who
was on the right side and we knew who was on the wrong side
and now that is all up for grabs. This is also true of natural gas.
Natural gas is seen as an essential bridge fuel with lower carbon
intensity than coal and far fewer air pollution impacts. We are
currently facing an unprecedented supply of natural gas located
in tight shale rock, which we now can reach through horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing.
The question is how should one feel about this? If one simply
opposes both fracking and nuclear energy, what energy sources
are we left with? Wind, solar, and geothermal energy are a tiny
percentage of our energy mix at the moment, and hydropower, at
least in this country, is largely tapped out. On the transportation
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side, the energy supply is almost 100% oil; and biofuels, despite
the federal production mandate embodied in EPA’s renewable
fuels standard, are in their infancy. Energy demand is going to
be more than 53% greater by 2030 globally and is projected to
double by 2050. I want you to think about that. We are 85% dependent on fossil fuels. Even if you dramatically incentivize renewable energy, even if you make tremendous strides promoting
wind and solar, including figuring out storage strategies, and
build a transmission to deliver them from remote locations to the
load centers, even if you invest in energy efficiency (the first best
thing to do) and aggressively promote biofuels production, in the
face of global energy demand, you cannot close the gap anytime
soon.
So we are dependent on fossil fuels for the foreseeable future
and the question is how might we develop an energy strategy that
deals with that reality and at the same time transitions us into a
cleaner future with a more sustainable trajectory over time?
That is very challenging. The EPA regulations that I described to
you, including the GHG-specific regulations and the traditional
EPA standards for conventional air pollution, are helping to drive
coal retirement faster than people anticipated. Some people say
20% of the coal fleet will retire by 2020, others say up to 30%.
This is a very important dynamic. Indeed, it is a GHG strategy.
It may be a little opaque, but the combination of what EPA is doing under the Clean Air Act and the underlying fundamentals
(the economics) is driving a switch to gas from coal. From a climate change perspective that is a positive development. One
cannot be against everything. One has to be for something and,
in the current context, this shift should be seen as good news.
The question is always what’s next? From the bridge fuel
now where do you go? Of course the most essential ingredient of
a sensible policy is a price on carbon because without such a price
we cannot make renewables and other cleaner energy sources
more competitive; they cannot compete unless we actually put a
price on the negative climate related externalities, now being
consumed for free, of fossil energy. In the absence of a tax or a
cap or some other mechanism for pricing carbon, we are doing
these other things I described, but one cannot escape the need, ultimately, to price the thing that we treat as free, but which is
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not—the production of CO2, methane, and other global warming
gases.
I think the story I am trying to tell you is a story of accomplishing something and making progress with the tools you have
but ultimately confronting the need to do something much more
significant. The question before us is what does that policy look
like? What are the tools we are going to need whether we pass
them through Congress, through the states and regions or use executive power to try to accomplish them? Ultimately, what legal
and physical infrastructure can we build to make that happen?
Right now we do not have the regulatory tools and incentives we
need to produce a clean energy economy. We do not, for example,
have an adequate system to regulate fracking to ensure that it is
done safely and responsibly. We are in the middle of a transition
regarding our regulatory approach to offshore drilling, and we are
at a moment when the Arctic is beginning to be opened up and we
do not yet have the data or information we need to know with
reasonable confidence that we can drill there safely and in an environmentally protective manner. Likewise, we do not yet have a
liability regime for carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).
Even if we could produce CCS at scale in an economic way, which
is an open question, we do not have a legal regime that addresses
liability as we do for the nuclear industry, for example.
My point is: we do not have the legal regime we need. The
Clean Air Act, although a marvelous tool, and although I think
the EPA is being quite reasonable with it, is essentially limited.
It cannot do everything necessary on GHG regulation, and certainly not cost-effectively, in its current form. Right now, the best
approach to regulating GHGs under the Clean Air Act is to use
the New Source Performance Standard program, through which
EPA sets best available technology standards on an industrial
category basis. Yet this program is limited because it addresses
only new and modified sources and only very indirectly requires
states to submit plans for existing sources. And there appears to
be no authority for EPA to use a cap-and-trade program, which,
believe me, they would like to do, to reduce the costs of GHG reductions.
So I am telling you a story of imperfection in the existing
tools. At some point we have to build a new legal infrastructure
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to go with what we hope will be a new physical and technological
infrastructure for a cleaner energy age. That is the picture and
the challenge I want to leave you with. I suppose my account
might strike you as a little depressing, in the sense that some of
us thought we would be further along by now; some of us thought
that the consensus and political will on climate change had
gelled. Yet my story is still somewhat hopeful I think, about our
ability to make at least some progress, by taking advantage of the
drivers that we still have, if we know how to use them well.
Thank you.
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